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PSYOP OF THE STRATEGIC
HAMLET IN VIETNAM

SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Ret.)

A Typical Vietnamese Hamlet

When the British fought the insurgency led by Chinese Communists in Malaya from 1948 to 1960, one of their weapons was to place the Malayans in fortified villages that could be guarded around the clock and thus separate the people from the guerrillas in the jungle. That was one very successful way to fight Mao Tse-Tung’s concept that “The guerilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.”

Under the direction of the retired Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, the shortcomings of the government were identified. These included the lack of population control measures. From these considerations, the “Briggs Plan” was formulated. The guerrillas would first be separated from the civilian population that sustained them, and then defeated through coordinated civil, military and police action.

The first part of the Briggs plan called for the large-scale resettlement of about 500,000 squatters in the jungle fringes to “New villages.” These subsistence farmers were the main source of food for the rebel army. Started in June 1950, this program resettled 423,000 Chinese squatters in 410 new villages by 1952. These new villages had a defense perimeter to ensure controlled entry and exit. The government gave every family five months' worth of provisions and all the materials needed to build a house. This gave the squatters an immediate sense of ownership. The communists were now forced to come out of the jungle and into the open to search for food. It made them vulnerable to attack and ambush. In 1951 the British introduced the “food denial” program called Operation Starvation. This program was designed to stop the smuggling of excess food to the Communists. The measures included ration reduction, punching canned food at time of purchase, strict checks by the guards on all personnel moving in and out of the villages, and forbidding meals from being brought to work areas. Communal cooking of rice was encouraged to prevent any private ownership of uncooked rice that might be smuggled to the Communists. The guerrillas were now forced to come further out of the jungle to meet their suppliers, who could be identified, “turned,” and used as a source to set up additional ambushes.

Sergio Miller mentions these “new villages” in Malaya – the Myth of hearts and Minds. He says:

The Briggs Plan that involved the forcible transplant of as many as 500,000 Chinese and other ethnic groups into New Villages was a success because it was basically a sound economic and social plan (500,000 is the commonly quoted number. A high figure of 600,000 is quoted by Barber, N. The War of the Running Dogs, 1971, p. 118)…The transplanted communities recognized that they were getting a good deal, not least because the policy increased employment (Eventually, 582 new villages were constructed, of which only 6 were judged to have failed). The keys were: title to land, better quality of life, material and physical support, mutual support, and effective defense…The new villages included schools, clinics, and electricity, a novelty for many poor Chinese.

Building a Strategic Hamlet Bamboo Barrier

Andrew R. Molnar

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies

During the Vietnam War, the Republic of Vietnam had the same problem. Large numbers of Communist Viet Cong were able to enter villages and take food either voluntary or as a “tax” by armed collectors.

Midshipman Jason Thomas Chaput defines the hamlet problem in his 2000 thesis, The Chieu Hoi Program and Perceptions of Reality:

During the 1960s, the political and military cadres orchestrated a mass seizure of hamlets from the Government of Vietnam across the country. Hamlets were clusters of homes, where several hamlets constituted a village. With the aid of superior intelligence gathering and lethal tactics such as abductions, forced indoctrinations, and even executions, the Viet Cong removed any obstacles presented by the supporters of the Government of Vietnam in the hamlets.

In the battle for the hamlets, the use of ambushes and the destruction of vital bridges and roads by the Viet Cong effectively cut off the Government of Vietnam and its military forces from many villages. Once the Government of Vietnam abandoned a village, the population gave up hope of overcoming the Communists, and the VC needed only to execute a few important villagers to win the individual hamlets. By organizing large political groups in the villages, the cadres succeeded in getting thousands of young males per month to join the local Viet Cong guerrilla forces.

Using the British tactics, and in some cases British advisors, Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem first implemented a “Rural Community Development Program (also called “Agroville”) in 1959. Through direct force and/or incentives, peasants in rural communities were separated and relocated into large communities called "Agrovilles". By 1960, there were twenty-three of these Agrovilles, each consisting of many thousands of people.

Kevin Ruane says in the Vietnam Wars, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York:

A precursor to notorious Strategic Hamlets, the so-called “Agroville” program began in 1958-1959. It was designed to relocate the peasantry in area where the army could protect them from Viet Cong terror and propaganda, and the Saigon government sought to make it attractive by providing the new communities with schools, medical facilities and electricity. But the peasants deeply resented being forcibly removed from their homes and from the lands which contained the sacred bones of their ancestors. The Agroville program was eventually abandoned, but only after it had spawned tremendous rural discontent with the government.

Seth Jacobs says in Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam – 1950-1963:

Diem's insistence that the peasants build the agrovilles themselves – in forced labor gangs, no less, and without compensation – did nothing to improve his reputation in South Vietnam, but even more counterproductive was the fact that the peasants grouped into agrovilles had to abandon their ancestral lands. In a culture like Vietnam’s, where people were deeply attached to home and village, such uprooting was traumatic, and many South Vietnamese resented it.

A Senseless death…

This is the earliest American leaflet I have seen that mentions the hamlets. It was printed by a Special Forces advisory team in 1964. It is so early that it does not bear a code. It depicts a Bell UH-1 Iroquois “Huey” helicopter firing a rocket. The text on the front is:

A Senseless Death Awaits You.

The back of the leaflet is all text and says:

To Our Friends Fighting in the Ranks of the Viet Cong

If you attack the Army of the Republic of Vietnam or if you attack the New Life Hamlets, you will die horrible deaths as the result of the fire of the weapons that are carried by this helicopter. It will appear whenever and wherever you launch an attack.

In order to avoid a pointless, needless death, you should leave the ranks of the Viet Cong and bring your weapons with you to return to the arms of the Republic of Vietnam. The government will give you a reward and will ensure your safety and the safety of your families.

The people, your relatives, your families, and your wives and children are waiting for you.

Leaflet 246-54-67

This leaflet uses threats to encourage Vietnamese civilians to move to the strategic hamlets. It depicts their old village occupied by the Viet Cong and bombed, while their new hamlet is safe and protected by the Army of Vietnam. 100,000 leaflets were printed by the 246th PSYOP Company and disseminated by aircraft. The back is all text and says in part:

To protect your lives and properties, you must move immediately and resettle in new life hamlets in the secure areas of Ben Cau, Can Giang, and Ben Keo. Your present hamlets will be bombed and fired on every night to destroy Viet Cong installations in your area…The Government of Vietnam regrets that you have to leave your rice fields and gardens, therefore, you will be allowed – if requests are submitted to the District Chief – to return to your homes and work on your rice fields and gardens, take care of your property, and return to the new location at night...

Leaflet 1046

A similar threatening leaflet was prepared by the Vietnamese Army. At the right we see safe and happy Vietnamese living within a protected hamlet. At the upper left, a Viet Cong with machete hides behind a bush and stalks an unarmed farmer. The text is:

You will be terrorized by the Viet Cong if you live by yourself.

Gathered together you will have a good life.

Text on the back says that the Viet Cong have been beaten but small bands of them are dangerous. The people are encouraged to go to the hamlets:

Gathering in one place the Army and the Government will protect you. The Viet Cong dare not come and terrorize your life; and your property is protected. To live in peace and prosperity, dear countrymen, you have to gather in a large group. The Army and the Government are ready to help you and insure your safety.

Stanley Karnow devotes seven pages to the Strategic Hamlet program in Vietnam – A History, The Viking Press, N.Y., 1983. None of his comments are complimentary and almost all of them echo the same complaints heard from other critics. Some of Karnow’s comments on the agroville program are:

Another blunder at the time was the creation of Khu Tru Mat, known as agrovilles, farm communities designed mainly to isolate the rural population from the Communists…The agroville near Vi Thanh looked magnificent…Flanking a canal, it was enclosed by a bamboo fence, and neat rows of thatched-roof hits had been laid out. Its director…showed me the school dispensary, and power plant…He boasted that he had completed the project in fifty days on Diem’s personal instructions.

In reality, it was a disaster…peasants assigned to the agroville had been uprooted from their native villages and ancestral graves, and their traditional social pattern disrupted, for reasons they could not fathom. Worse still…twenty thousand peasants were mobilized to construct a project that could only hold six thousand.   Thus, fourteen thousand men and women had been compelled to abandon their crops and work without pay for others.

Ngo Dinh Diem

We should take just a moment to mention Vietnam’s first President Ngo Dinh Diem. He authorized the Strategic Hamlet Program and took much of the blame for its failure, although it is doubtful that anyone could have made it work in a country where the land is sacred and removing one from it, even for the best of reasons, is bound to cause controversy. He was attacked for nepotism and his administration for corruption. Certainly there was corruption, but there were also the constant verbal and written attacks from North Vietnam and the Communist bloc nations so it is difficult to say what was real and what was propaganda. He was also attacked for his pro-Catholic beliefs in a nation that was largely Buddhist. The government was regarded as being biased towards Catholics in public service and military promotions, as well as the allocation of land, business favors and tax concessions. Another problem that will seem strange considering that North Vietnam called Diem an American ”Lackey,” was that he simply would not take orders from his American advisors. They wanted him to act a certain way and to fight the war in an approved American manner. He wanted to do it his way. Much of the problem might have been caused by his fear of a coup and his desire to keep the generals weak and divided, but the result was that he nourished the very coup d'état that he fought on a daily basis. He thought that the generals were out to get him and he was right. Diem’s reputation eventually was tarnished enough that the United States washed its hands of him. Although there is no smoking gun to show that any U.S. agency took part in his overthrow and murder, there is reason to believe that the Vietnamese generals were assured that American funds would not be cut if he was murdered. On 1 November 1963 Diem was overthrown and the generals told him he could leave the country safely to live in exile. Instead, they murdered him. Diem had been a strong anti-Communist and Ho Chi Minh allegedly said when hearing of the coup:

I can scarcely believe the Americans would be so stupid.

The North Vietnamese Politburo was even more surprised:

The consequences of the 1 November coup d'état will be contrary to the calculations of the U.S. imperialists...Diem was one of the strongest individuals resisting the people and Communism. Everything that could be done in an attempt to crush the revolution was carried out by Diem. Diem was one of the most competent lackeys of the U.S. imperialists…The coup d'état on 1 November 1963 will not be the last

The independent researcher and author Nguyen Ky Phong had this to say about Diem:

Diem was not the best but he was much better than his predecessors, especially emperor Bao Dai. He also stood out among his contemporaries as an incorruptible, unapproachable anti-French patriot. His ascension to power was neither based on his relation with the colonialists or any power, at least before he was appointed Prime Minister by Bao Dai with American and French consent. While many Vietnamese national leaders indulged in the privileges that accompanied their positions, President Diem did not. He lived a life of an ascetic.

He did have weaknesses. His dependency on his brothers and parochial and religious associates was too great to allow him to make an independent and realistic assessment of the actual situation in Vietnam. He traveled from time to time to visit his subjects, but some believe that the people he met were told what to say and how to act. There were reports that his three brothers used his name to build financial and political influence for themselves. Governmental and Civil Service procedures were not followed or enforced by the president, which caused grave discontent and distrust within the rank and file of civil servants. Certain military officers were promoted due to their wealth, family or connection with the president's staff or family. The position of Secretary of Defense was not filled until the final days of the regime. The position of Presidential Advisor was delegated to the president's brother (Ngo Dinh Nhu)  without the consent or advice of the senate or any authoritative government agency. During the length of his presidency Diem was unable to fend off accusations of nepotism, cronyism and favoritism.

The question of what might have happened if President Diem was left in power, is difficult to answer. There were two earlier attempts to overthrow Diem. The abortive November 1960 coup d'etat should have been a warning to Diem but he failed to react or order any reform to appease the opposition. Could the Diem regime have survived had the United States not acquiesced to a coup to replace him? Would he eventually have changed his course, replaced his many yes-men and overhauled his entire administration? And, even if he were to do all that, would South Vietnam have survived the relentless and determined attacks from the Communist North? Diem was not allowed to live so we will never know might have happened.

An aerial view of a fortified Vietnamese hamlet

John R, Campbell, a civilian psychological warfare advisor in Vietnam from 1965 to 1967 mentions Diem and the strategic hamlets briefly in Are we Winning? Are they Winning: A Civilian Advisor’s Reflections on Wartime Vietnam, Author House, 2004:

An early attempt was made to emulate the British experience and success in Malayan post World War II Communist insurgency. This was the forced transfer of scattered populations into fortified villages called strategic hamlets where passage in and out was controlled. This was making some positive headway under the firm dictatorial hand of President Ngo Dinh Diem, but it was allowed to lapse even before his abrupt and violent departure from the scene in 1963. The “political wisdom” of the early ‘60s was that the fortified village plan was too oppressive and prison-like for acceptance by either the general public in Vietnam or in America.  In retrospect, they would have been doing both themselves and the rural population a favor to have them just grumbling at their protectors rather than shooting at each other as turned out to be the alternative.

After Diem, there was a parade of leaders none as strong or as able to lead the nation in its war against the Communists. He is still reviled in the press to this day, but many Vietnamese believe he was the only man that could have led the country to ultimate victory against the North Vietnamese.

Leaflet 3063

This leaflet was prepared to convince the people that leaving their home villages were a worthwhile action. Two farmers are cutting wood to build a house on the front. The text is:

WE WOULD RATHER LEAVE OUR BIRTH PLACE THAN LIVE UNDER THE COMMUNISTS.

The text on the back says in part:

The slogan speaks for itself. The people would rather leave their birth place and live in freedom rather than under Communist rule. The Government of Vietnam is helping the refugees in My Ca to build their new homes and start life again in freedom.

This mass resettlement created a strong backlash from peasants and forced the central government to rethink its strategy. One critical report stated:

Tens of thousands of people are being mobilized… to take up a life in collectivity, to construct beautiful but useless agrovilles which tire the people, lose their affection, increase their resentment and most of all give an additional terrain for propaganda to the enemy.

Song Sheet 1685 - Let us build up the New Hamlets

This Marching is song designed to inspire the Rural Development Cadre to develop the hamlets as a means of serving the people and help in transforming the nation. Printed by the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO)

In 1961, the government of Government of South Vietnam (GVN) along with several U.S. advisors and the head of the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam, Sir Robert Thompson, began reforming the Agroville Plan into what was to become the Strategic Hamlet Program (Ap Chien Luoc)later revitalized as the New Life Hamlet (Ap Doi Moi) and finally revised into the Secure Hamlet (Ap Tan Sin). The new plan called for smaller communities (less than a thousand residents) erected on both existing and newly developed settlements. The GVN wanted to create a new infrastructure with the intention that the Vietnamese peasants would come to identify Diem and his regime as the legitimate government.

Thomas Ahern mentions the arrival of Thompson and the CIA attitude toward the Strategic Hamlets in his declassified secret “Center for the Study of Intelligence” publication: CIA and the Rural Pacification in South Vietnam. Ahern adds:

By the end of 1961 Diem acquired a foreign counterinsurgency adviser of his own - Sir Robert G. K. Thompson, who had participated in the British campaign against the Chinese Communist insurgents in Malaya. Thompson called first for the eradication of the insurgents, then for social and economic improvements to consolidate the improved morale he expected this to evoke. Nhu and Colby CIA), continuing to affirm the Strategic Hamlet's "essentially political core," accepted Thompson's order of priorities, in which the completion of security arrangements; moats, perimeter fences, a militia, etc. - preceded political reforms and economic development.

Except where the GVN could quarantine the population with a barrier of troops, the success of this approach depended on the active participation of villagers who shared the perception of the Communists as an oppressive, alien presence. The difficulty was that many villagers had from childhood viewed things "through the prism of Viet Cong ideas, beliefs, and prejudices." Indeed, there were families that had supported the Viet Minh and its successors for three generations.

The only direct CIA support to Strategic Hamlets came in the form of training and weapons for some of Ngo Dinh Nhu's Republican Youth, who were used to bolster hamlet defenses. As of November 1962, 1,625 such cadres had been issued weapons upon completion of what the Station called "advanced" training; no reporting on their deployment or subsequent service has been found.

Lieutenant Colonel Peter Francis Leahy says in Why did the Strategic Hamlet Program Fail:

By mid-1961 South Vietnam had already started strategic hamlets, and the government had some experience with pacification through the Agroville scheme. But, as Diem struggled with the problems of insurgency, he turned to other countries in an attempt both to learn from their experiences and, more particularly, to gain moral, material, and financial support. Diem sought advice and assistance from both the Philippines and Malaya, as well as from the countries that had supported them. This included British advisers from Malaya andU.S. advisers from the Philippines.

Although the experiences in Malaya and the Philippines were unique, there were many similarities with the situation in the Republic ofVietnam. Both Malaya and the Philippines used pacification as a major component of their strategy to defeat their insurgencies. As Diem considered his options, it was natural that he should look at these experiences.

Leaflet 3062

This leaflet shows a new housing area open to Vietnamese citizens. The text on the front is:

The Government of Vietnam builds; The Communists destroy

The back is all text and says in part:

TO BUILD FOR THE PEOPLE

…the government has built an extremely good compound which includes more than 1500 apartments with all the conveniences like electricity and running water. The housing compound has a school, kindergarten, hospital and several administrative buildings. This undertaking shows the real concern of the Government of Vietnam for the poor citizens and its continual efforts in raising the standard of life of the people.

In 1962 the general plan was to build 11,000 to 12,000 hamlets, enough to shelter the entire population. 7,000 hamlets would be completed in 1962, the remainders to be ready for occupation by early 1964. In late 1962, President Diem stated that 7,267,517 people lived in strategic hamlets. These numbers do not correspond with any figures provided by the Allies and probably were exaggerations forwarded to the President by his aides.

A fortified village protected by sharpened bamboo stakes

According to a 1963 American State Department document entitled “Strategic Hamlets,” the aims and objectives of the strategic hamlet program:

Is to achieve the widest possible popular response to the government’s counterinsurgency effort by providing the peasants with an increasing decree of physical security from Communist intimidation by enacting social, economic, and political reforms meaningful to the peasants in the context of their own traditions and expectations. It should be noted in a country such as Vietnam, which has emerged only recently from almost a hundred years of colonial rule and where popular concepts of government have been locally rather than nationally oriented, the very fact that the national government would seek to serve and protect the citizenry might itself be considered revolutionary.

The immediate security objectives of the program are two-fold: first, to sever Communist communication and control lines to the rural populace and this deny the Communists the local resources (manpower, food, intelligence and weapons) necessary to their operations; and second, to promote a nationwide self-defense effort at the rice-roots level by providing the peasant with weapons and other defense facilities.

Sketch of Model Strategic Hamlet

Department of State Research Memorandum - 1 July 1963

The document goes on to describe an average strategic hamlet:

The strategic hamlet is essentially a fortified hamlet. A fence of bamboo and barbed wire is built around the entire hamlet, and a ditch or moat is dug around the fence. The ditch or moat, in turn, is encircled by an earthen mound. The area around the village is cleared to permit fields of fire and to avoid giving guerrillas and terrorists hiding places close to the hamlet.

Inside the strategic hamlet, there are one or more observation towers, guard posts, and a defense post for the storage of arms. An alarm system, either of the most rudimentary type (a bell, gong, or bamboo drum) or of field telephones, alerts the community to Communist attack.

The Research Study Series publication The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia adds:

Two types of strategic hamlets were planned. One, designed for use in areas dominated by guerrillas, called for physical relocation of the population to well-secured areas, surrounded by a wide ditch, a mud embankment with bamboo spikes, and barbed wire. These hamlets differed from the agrovilles both by housing fewer people and by being situated closer to the rice fields. This type went into operation in Binh Duong and in the delta. The other, for use in more secure regions, was built by simply enlarging and fortifying already existing villages. Some thinly inhabited sections would have no strategic villages at all, but would be shielded only by militia stationed in strategically located stone watchtowers.

Leahy mentions three types of hamlets:

The first type was the heavily fortified hamlets found in the contested areas around Saigon. In these hamlets much of the area was surrounded by extensive earthworks, including a ditch, about five feet deep and a rampart ten feet wide at the top. Both the ditch and rampart were studded with bamboo spears. Outside the ditch there was generally a fence of bamboo, wooden pickets, thorn hedges, or barbed wire.

In the second type, observed in Vinh Long Province, which had less of a security problem, the hamlets were divided into defensive blocks which comprised most of the residential areas. These blocks were afforded defense by bamboo spears embedded in the ground, thorn hedges portable steel spike boards, and a few hand grenades p1anted as landmines.

The third type, observed in Kien Hoa Province was the least heavily defended. In these, the fortifications and defensive devices were usually limited to the military post.

Leaflet 3781

In all the comments about the strategic hamlets a common thread is that the people must be trained to protect themselves and their hamlets so the army can get about its business of fighting the Communists. Leaflet 3781 depicts members of the trained Civil Self Defense Forces. On the front armed members are depicted on patrol, on the back they march in a parade. The text says in part:

CIVIL SELF DEFENSE FORCES

As of now, three million people have participated in the Civil Self Defense Forces throughout the country. Among them, 1.5 million members have received training and have been armed with weapons. In 1970, over 40,000 more will be armed.

This is an effective force to defend the security of villages and hamlets, and is ready to crush every terrorist attack of the Communists to insure a peaceful life for the people.

Leaflet 2799

This leaflet depicts a number of Vietnamese men who have joined the popular forces to defend the hamlets and the nation. The text on the front is:

IT IS EVERYBODY’S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT THE NATION

The back is all text and discusses some of the purposes of the People’s self-defense plan. The text is:

a. To mobilize the entire population for participation in the war.

b. To create a force to defend our villages and cities in order to increase the availability of troops to the armed forces at the front.

c. To unify the people’s will to defend the National Righteous Cause in the political struggle against the enemy.

d. To create a popular force which supports the voices of the nation at the international conference table.

e. To support every aspect of an all-out long and difficult war in order to advance towards self-sufficiency, self-reliance, and self-determination.

f. To make general mobilization a reasonable policy by utilizing the national potential equally in all fields of activity. This will permit the fighting to be carried on without impeding national production because the rear echelons are actively supporting the fighting men.

Let us join together to protect the nation.

Leahy states that in the early 1960s the Self Defense Corps numbered about 60,000 and provided the military basis of the strategic hamlet system. The Corps was responsible for security within the hamlet and the area immediately around it. They performed tasks such as guarding public buildings and bridges, escorting village officials in unsafe areas and patrolling the village area.

Leaflet 3064

Leaflet 3064 depicts a hamlet being built. The back is all text and says in part:

ONE OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS

This is the declaration of Lieutenant Colonel Vu The Quang, Mayor of Can Ranh…From 12 and 20 December 1968, more than 191 families have been resettled at My Ca Village, 15 kilometers from Cam Ranh City. This resettlement shows that the righteous cause of the Government of Vietnam has beaten the dictatorial regime of the Communists.

Leaflet NT3/A/TD4

This rather rare Vietnamese leaflet depicts both a New Life Hamlet and Vietnamese troops helping to build a home. The back depicts two ralliers farming the land. Text on the front is:

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM PACIFICATION PROGRAM

From Highland to Lowland, New Life Hamlets bring back security to the citizens.

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam helps the people to build homes.

The newly pacified hamlets have a bright future.

Text on the back is:

Two ralliers participate in the farming to rebuild a new life.

Curiously, the same leaflet was also disseminated as NT4/A/TD-1. There is a minor change in the text on this leaflet.

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM PACIFICATION PROGRAM

From the Highland down to the Lowland, the New Life Hamlets bring back security to the people.

The Republic of Vietnam Army helps the people the build houses.

Ngo Dinh Nhu was the younger brother of President Diem and placed in charge of the Strategic Hamlet program. He wanted the peasants in the hamlets to take personal charge of their lives and protection. He asked them fight to defend the hamlet, and to contribute labor and money. He said in 1962:

The regime inside the strategic hamlet should be revolutionary, but the revolution should be within each individual. There will be a system of guerrilla fighters within the hamlet. Everyone inside will participate in combat except the young, old and infirm.

Participation is considered a citizen’s duty. There is no reason for not participating. Contributions will also be necessary, to take the form of five to ten days of labor and from fifty tone thousand piasters from each citizen over the age of 18.

It would be easy to write thousands of words on the program; its successes and its failure. Interested readers should study the Pentagon Papers, which go into this program in great detail. For the purposes of this article, we will just give a brief introduction to the program, and then discuss the psychological operations (PSYOP) that was used in an attempt to sell the concept to the Vietnamese people. Unfortunately, the program was doomed to failure because of the great love of the Vietnamese people for their hereditary land and their freedom. Any program that removed the people from their traditional lands and inhibited their freedom of movement was destined for failure from the start. Everyone had a different motive and saw the program as a way to achieve different aims. To the Americans it was a way to remove the Viet Cong from the population and starve them out. To Diem it was a way to control his own people and gain support for his government. For the peasants and farmers it meant a lack of movement and removal from the lands that held the bones of their ancestors. Finally, for the Viet Cong it was a propaganda bonanza where they could claim that the American and Vietnamese governments were building concentration camps to hold innocent Vietnamese farmers and peasants in confinement.

Communist guerrillas study a mock-up of a 

strategic hamlet before a scheduled attack.

Some of the Communist reaction to the strategic hamlets was vitriolic, claiming that the hamlets were:

Concentration camps into which the Vietnamese government will forcibly herd 14 million rural, urban, and mountain people…to trample upon the life customs, habits, democratic freedom, and the most common sentiments and interests of human beings…and ultimately to annihilate the Vietnamese people. Resist the program and destroy hamlets wherever they exist.

The Communists also went to great pains to try and place agents and propagandists within the hamlets. A classified document from a South Vietnamese military intelligence agent known as H-414 dated 29 May 1967 says in part:

As of 23 May 1967, the Giong Trom District Committee instructed village parties to set up studies on revolutionary policy for cadre members’ party groups and civilians. Following studies, participants were to be recruited by village civil affairs sections to operate overtly in New-Life Hamlets and disseminate Viet Cong propaganda.

An anti-Hamlet National Liberation Front poster by the artist

Huynh Van Gam. It depicts an NVA Bayonet through a U.S. Army Helmet.

Notice the Barbed Wire. It implies that the Strategic Hamlet is a Prison instead of a Refuge from the Viet Cong

6,000 copies of a 1962 booklet entitled Let us Develop the Fighting Spirit to destroy the Americano-Diem Strategic Hamlets were published by the Communist Liberation Printing Office at Bac Lieu as anti-strategic hamlet training material for party members and cadre. Some of the comments are:

This plan is the last card of the selling and invading regime of the Americans and Diem, having to fight passively the high revolutionary movement of the people. The enemies consider the failure of the strategic hamlets as the failure of their decaying regime…

Angry with the cruel enemy plot, the brave and unyielding South Vietnamese people continuously rise up and destroy almost all of their strategic hamlets…In just 20 days last September, 72 hamlets in 42 villages in Central Vietnam were destroyed. The enemies build the hamlets; we destroy them until they abandon the project. Some strategic hamlets have been destroyed 12 or 16 times…

As everyone knows, the so-called “Strategic Hamlet” is used as a jail with all the necessary characteristics, not only with barbed wire fences and guard towers, but also with an oppression machine inside it. That is the highest and most inhuman cruelty of the Americans and Diem….

Viet Cong Anti-Government Poetry Booklet

This 24-page Viet Cong booklet depicts a Viet Cong guerrilla holding ripped-out barbed wire from a liberated strategic hamlet, standing over a caricature of an American soldier and a Vietnamese with a dollar sign on his shirt showing that he had been purchased by the Americans. In the background we see a burning strategic hamlet that the Viet Cong have raided to “free the prisoners” inside. The entire booklet is filled with patriotic and anti-Government poems. It was brought home by a Special Forces Captain who was part of an advisory “A” Team in 1964. The text on the front cover is:

Poetry Volume: STEEL FLAME

Strategic hamlet

Issue No. 2, My Tho Artists Group

Boycott the Pacification Teams

This anti-Hamlet Communist propaganda leaflet was brought back by a retired Colonel who served as an Captain in Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) Advisory Team 55 at Rach Gia, Kien Giang Province, V Corps, in 1968. The leaflet is printed on one side on a crude yellowish paper. The text is:

BOYCOTT THE PACIFICATION TEAMS

Resolutely kill the pacification team members and boycott the New Life hamlets. The pacifiers are the Number One enemies of our people. They carry out the orders of the American imperialists and their lackeys, actively implement their schemes of terrorizing, attacking, and destroying villages and hamlets, and of conducting pacification programs that force the people into the so-called "New Life Hamlets," which are just a disguised form of the Diem-Nhu regime's old strategic hamlets, and are in fact prison camps. Their objective is to steal our population, steal our resources, prolong the war of aggression, and murder our compatriots.

Resolutely combat the enemy to protect yourselves and to protect the lives and the property of our compatriots. Every citizen should do everything he or she can to resolutely resist letting the enemy quarter soldiers in their homes. In addition, our people should dig solid bunkers to protect themselves from the bombs and shells of the American pirates.

MILITARY COMMITTEE

Rach Gia Province

Another Viet Cong leaflet is simply labeled “slogans.” It is hand written and so faded from the heat and moisture of the jungle that it really cannot be seen well. There are four slogans written on the leaflet and number 4 is:

Dissolution of strategic hamlets and areas, prohibition of acts forcing the people to gather, forcing them to leave their homes and robbing them of their property and land

Leaflet SP-71

The SP in the code tells us that this was a very early leaflet. The Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office used the “SP” for “Special Project” early in the war, but later removed it. This leaflet dates from December 1963. The propaganda wants to encourage the people to go to the hamlets, but does not say so in a straight-forward way. Instead, it talks about all of the education available in the hamlets and the construction of new schools and free books available to children and tools from America for adult workers. It is a nice back-handed way of advertising the Strategic Hamlets. The leaflet says that the local Province Chief, Major Ly Troung Nhon, will present hamlet students with gifts from the new government. The pictures show: a school girl in Ap Dau Giong with new textbooks; 32 kinds of tools given by the Americans for the hamlet workers; school children at a newly built school with their new textbooks; and school children in O Trau New Life Hamlet given copybooks at the dedication of a new 51-room school.

Poster 2982

This December 1968 poster is entitled “Revolutionary Development Harmony.”  It depicts a farmer in one of the hamlets and a member of the civilian defense force watching over the planting of rice. The text is:

The Revolutionary Development Program of the Republic of Vietnam promotes harmony in society.

In 1962, the Strategic Hamlet program was introduced. Similar to the Malayan fortified village structure, the peasants were moved voluntarily or forcibly into new villages in areas under the control of the South Vietnamese army. A stockade was built around the village and these were then patrolled by armed guards. In many cases the peasants did not want to move and so the South Vietnamese army often had to apply force. This increased the hostility of the peasants towards the government. There were numerous problems with the strategic village concept. For one, the peasants were angry at having to travel longer distances to reach their rice fields. There was also the religious factor; with some inhabitants believing that it was vitally important to live where their ancestors were buried. There were numerous complains. One observer stated:

Peasants resented working without pay to dig moats, implant bamboo stakes, and erect fences against an enemy that did not threaten them but directed its sights against government officials.

Poster 3408

This October 1969 poster depicts armed Vietnamese civilians protecting their hamlet. Notice that it is identical to poster 2602 below except for a change in the message. The text is:

THE PEOPLE’S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES FIGHT THE ENEMY AND PROTECT THE HAMLET

The People’s self-defense forces organize the hamlets to fight so that the people can have a bright, new, secure life.

In theory, the hamlets were to be heavily fortified and guarded by both residents of the communities and national patrols. Each hamlet was to have its own radio transmitter for communication as well as supply lines and medical and educational programs. Unfortunately, these programs never materialized for most of the hamlets.

By September 1962, 4.3 million people were housed in 3,225 completed hamlets with more than two thousand still under construction. By July 1963, over 8.5 million people had been settled in 7,205 hamlets according to figures given by the Vietnam Press. In less than a year, both the number of completed hamlets and its population had doubled. Given this rapid rate of construction, the GVN was unable to fully support or protect the hamlets or its residents, despite the immense funding by the United States government. Communist insurgents easily sabotaged and overran the poorly defended communities, gaining access to the South Vietnamese peasants.

Cartoon Book 2554

This May 1968 “comic book” is entitled “New Life Development.” It tells the story of Hoa Dong Hamlet and how the unsophisticated villagers and the Revolutionary Development Cadre worked together to build a new school, market, and other projects.

Leaflet 21501

I believe that this leaflet was prepared by the Vietnamese to be used by PSYOP troops in Vietnam. It is very early from about 1963 and the code is not one that the Americans used. The leaflet is found in an undated booklet entitled Leaflet Catalog Psywar Training. The front depicts happy Vietnamese citizens ridiculing a frightened Viet Cong facing an armed Vietnamese soldier outside the wire of a strategic hamlet. The text is:

Building up strategic hamlets in the Republic to realize true peace and to bring joy and tranquility to every family.

The back has additional cartoons of Vietnamese farmers under the control of the Viet Cong or inside a strategic hamlet. The text is:

North Vietnamese Communist: People are always herded to work in labor camps and die in thick forests.

Free South Vietnam: Our countrymen live comfortably and happily. The army and the people are as one mind.

A similar leaflet, probably printed by the Vietnamese Government and coded 1042/7 is all text. This leaflet was produced about 1963-1964. I quote some of the text:

To the Entire Population in Rural Areas

The cruel Communists have performed countless atrocities in their aggression on South Vietnam such as plundering and killing good people and destroying various achievements realized by the Government and the Republic of Vietnam for the people.

In order to protect rural areas and encircle the enemy, the national scheme of establishing strategic hamlets has been carried out throughout the country. The strategic hamlet will be a solid wall to obstruct any Communist aggressive plot and will be guarded by rural basic forces.

From now on, the Viet Cong will be completely isolated and will have to struggle against the people because of the people’s voluntary participation in the establishment of the strategic hamlets in order to protect their own lives and properties from the Communists who on various occasions have tried to take possession of them.

Down with U.S. Imperialists

I really should have added these in a separate section called “Enemy Leaflets” at the end of this article. However, since I started here I will add another very interesting Viet Cong leaflet depicting an American soldier pulling another soldier out of a pit where he has been killed by punji stakes. The text is:

Down with U.S. Imperialists

Pitfalls and Nail Ditches are Graves of U.S. Enemies

Strategic Hamlets are disguised concentration camps and prisons which President Diem and the Americans intend to put our fellow countrymen in.

Let us prevent the construction of enemy strategic hamlets.

Let us attack and destroy strategic hamlets.

Don’t supply the enemy with bamboo and logs so that they can build fences around the hamlets.

When fences are burned down, don’t let them be rebuilt.

Leaflet D.S.V./63/11

A third Vietnamese leaflet coded D.S.V./63/11 depicts Vietnamese civilians and soldiers working together and a farmer stabbing a Viet Cong terrorist. The back shows Army medics taking care of injured civilians. The drawings are rather crude cartoons and the text is flowery and not something that is normally found on American leaflets. Text on the front is:

The Army and the People are like fish in the water!

The Army and the People side by side build up STRATEGIC HAMLETS.

Determined to destroy Communists

Lovingly take care of one another.

Bringing good rice, warm clothes and affection…

What is most amazing about this text is the mention of the Army and people like fish in the ocean. This seems to have been stolen from Mao’s quote wrote in Aspects of China's Anti-Japanese Struggle (1948).

The people are like water and the army is like fish

The program is discussed in The Pentagon Papers, Beacon Press, Boston, 1971. Some of the comments are:

By early 1962, however, there was apparent consensus among the principal participants that the Strategic Hamlet Program, as it came to be called, represented the unifying concept for a strategy designed to pacify rural Vietnam (the Viet Cong's chosen battleground) and to develop support among the peasants for the central government.

The Strategic Hamlet Program was much broader than the construction of strategic hamlets per se. It envisioned sequential phases which, beginning with clearing the insurgents from an area and protecting the rural populace, progressed through the establishment of GVN infrastructure and thence to the provision of services which would lead the peasants to identify with their government. The strategic hamlet program was, in short, an attempt to translate the newly articulated theory of counter-insurgency into operational reality. The objective was political though the means to its realization were a mixture of military, social, psychological, economic and political measures.

The problem with the apparent consensus which emerged early in 1962 was that the principal participants did view it with different perspectives and expectations. On the U.S. side, military advisors had a set of preferences which affected their approach to the Strategic Hamlet Program. They wanted to make RVNAF more mobile, more aggressive, and better organized to take the offensive against the Viet Cong. They were, consequently, extremely leery of proposals which might lead it to be tied down in strategic defenses.

President Diem--unsurprisingly--had a very different view. His need, as he saw it, was to get the U.S. committed to South Vietnam (and to his administration) without surrendering his independence. He knew that his nation would fall without U.S. support; he feared that his government would fall if he either appeared to toady to U.S. wishes or allowed any single group too much potential power-particularly coercive power. The Strategic Hamlet Program offered a vehicle by which he could direct the counterinsurgent effort as he thought it should be directed and without giving up either his prerogatives to the U.S. or his mantle to his restless generals.

A number of contributory reasons can be cited for the failure of the Strategic Hamlet Program. Over-expansion of construction and poor quality of defenses forms one category.

Having said this, it does not automatically follow that the program would have succeeded even if Diem had met U.S. demands for change. To point to the causes of failure is one thing; to assume that changes of style would have led to success is quite another. It may well be that the program was doomed from the outset because of peasant resistance to measures which changed the pattern of rural life--whether aimed at security or control. It might have been possible, on the other hand, for a well-executed program eventually to have achieved some measure of success. The early demise of the program does not permit a conclusive evaluation. The weight of evidence suggests that the Strategic Hamlet Program was fatally flawed in its conception by the unintended consequence of alienating many of those whose loyalty it aimed to win.

Strategic Hamlet Information Cards

Two sets of cards were prepared that were designed for use by the American advisors in the field. They were coded SP-38 and SP-39. Both cards were for the advisor who needed to know pertinent military, sociological and economic information. Once filled out, the cards also served as a historical record of vital information for succeeding generations of American advisors.

The first card lists security and military information in a hamlet such as the nearest helicopter pad, nearby roads, communication facilities, status of defense forces, etc. It also provided for recording of Viet Cong activities against the hamlet as well as measures planned and undertaken to improve security and defense./p>

The second card lists basic categories of sociological and economic information such as education, health and sanitation facilities and social services. It also provides for recording status and progress of self-help projects.

The idea for the cards originated with the G-5 (Civil Affairs) advisor to the 5th Division (Vietnam). Two sets of 1,500 copies of each card were printed by USIS. Samples were distributed in IV Corps and they were made available to units in other Corps areas.

Most historians today agree that the Strategic or “New Life” hamlet program was a failure. We must therefore ask why it was so successful in Malaya and so unproductive in Vietnam. The Malayan Communists were a Chinese minority among the Malayans, and many were despised by the ethnic Malay, so putting them behind wire probably did not bother the vast majority of the populace. Rice was scarce in Malaya so putting the farmers into the hamlets forced the enemy into the open. Vietnam is a “bread basket,” and even with a vast number of the population behind ditches and bamboo the Communists were still able to find food. Also, the Malayan Communists were not constantly supported by the Soviet Unionand Red China as the Vietnamese were. There was no vast public outcry over the Chinese placed in protected villages in Malaya, while the left-wing press in both the Soviet-bloc nations and even the United States called the Vietnamese hamlets “concentration camps” and depicted American GIs burning Vietnamese huts saying “We had to burn the village to save it.” We should also point out that the Malayan Chinese, many being recent arrivals to Malaya, were not tied to the land in the same way the Vietnamese, who could often trace their ownership back 1000 years. It has been said that the strategic hamlets generated refugees because they destroyed those social arrangements which gave form to the lives of the villagers. Everyone was tied to the land. As one defector explained:

A piece of property in the village, however big or small it was, represents the results of hard work and savings through many generations, and the villagers were very reluctant to leave it behind for an unknown future.

Major James M. Higgins discusses the various problems encountered by the Strategic Hamlet program in his 2001 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College thesis entitled The Misapplication of the Malayan Counterinsurgency Model to the Strategic Hamlet Program. The author says in part:

President Diem viewed the insurgency as a military problem. He realized that he had to separate the rural peasants from Viet Cong influence. His approach was to secure areas of the countryside and physically control the population. Above all, the Americans wanted Diem to adopt a clear, national counterinsurgency strategy…eventually; this national strategy became known as the strategic hamlet program…In his quest to maintain a level of perceived autonomy from the US, Diem requested the British government send a team of experts to advise him on a counterinsurgency strategy…Thompson drew on his experience in Malaya and developed a plan for Diem in November 1961. The Delta Plan, as it was known, called for securing the rural populated areas.

President Diem agreed with the overall concept of strategic hamlets and in February 1962 established the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets…The South Vietnamese government with MAAG support began the Strategic Hamlet Program on 22 March 1962 with Operation Sunrise.

…Despite US money and equipment, construction was often slipshod and corrupt administrators withheld money from the peasants. The breakneck pace of the resettlement program caused inefficiency. These problems were not an accident. It was later discovered that the man chosen by Nhu to oversee the program was a communist agent (Albert Pham Ngoc Thao ) who intentionally directed the program to maximize peasant animosity

On 1 November 1963, with US knowledge and implied approval, several of key Diem senior officers staged a coup. On 2 November 1963, coup members executed Diem and Nhu in the back of an armored personnel carrier. The death of Diem and Nhu marked the end of the strategic hamlet program as the national counterinsurgency strategy.

It was understandable that the South Vietnamese and Americans would try to learn from the British experience in Malaya. However, the three parties failed to understand that the differences in Malaya and South Vietnam meant that the strategic hamlet program was destined to failure when applied in South Vietnam. The population, insurgency, and bureaucracy in Vietnam combined to create a set of conditions that favored the insurgents, not the government.

Stanley Karnow says about the strategic hamlet:

Diem and Nhu saw the strategic hamlet program as essentially a means to spread their influence rather than a device to infuse peasants with the will to resist the Viet Cong…The program surged ahead; the regime announced with dubious precision at the end of September 1962 that 4,322,034 people, or 33.39 percent of the population, were in strategic hamlets, with more schedule to move.

RAND researcher John Donnell later called the figure “statistical razzle-dazzle” of the kind that pleased McNamara…In reality the program often converted peasants into Viet Cong sympathizers…Interestingly, Nhu’s chief lieutenant in carrying out the strategic hamlet program was Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao, the secret Communist operative…had deliberately propelled the program ahead at breakneck speed in order to estrange South Vietnam’s peasants and drive them into the arms of the Vietnam. Nhu had been duped.

Earl Young, the senior U.S. representative in Long An province reported in early December 1963 that three-quarters of the two hundred strategic hamlets in Long An had been destroyed, either by the Viet Cong or by their own occupants. 

In Military Review, March-April 2005, Dr. Montgomery McFate discusses problems of the Strategic Hamlet in an article entitled “Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship.” He says in part:

Gerald Hickey, who went to Vietnam as a University of Chicago graduate student and remained throughout the war as a researcher for the RAND Corporation, found that their deep knowledge of Vietnam was frequently ignored by U.S. military leaders who increasingly adopted a conventional-war approach as the conflict progressed.

Hickey, who wrote “Village in Vietnam,” was recruited by RAND in 1961 to produce a study…of the newly established Strategic Hamlet Program that sought to consolidate governmental authority in pacified areas through a defense system and administrative reorganization at the village level. Central to the study was the question of how highland tribes could be encouraged to support the South Vietnamese Government. Hickey’s research indicated that the strategic hamlets might be successful if farmers saw evidence their communal labor and contribution of time, land, and building materials actually resulted in physical and economic security. Although Hickey’s observations were probably correct, his views were often dismissed as too pacifistic. When Hickey debriefed Marine General Victor Krulak, the general pounded his fist on his desk and said, “We are going to make the peasants do what’s necessary for strategic hamlets to succeed!” As Hickey noted, peasants have many methods of passive and active resistance, and force is often counterproductive as a motivator. Disliking the results of the study, the Pentagon pressured RAND to change the findings and, in the interest of impartial research, RAND refused. In the end none of Hickey’s findings were implemented, and the Strategic Hamlet Program was a failure.

Information Letter

It is clear that there were problems with the Strategic Hamlet program. The uncoded leaflet above was prepared by the 244th PSYOP Company for the Vietnamese 12th Division Tactical Area in Quang Ngai Province. The leaflet explains that the people are expected to supply labor for the hamlet and the army will take harsh measures against anyone they suspect of sabotage. Some of the all-text leaflet is:

Information Letter

Important Report

In order to insure expeditious resettlement of the population in Duc Pho and Mo Duc Districts, Quang Ngai Province, the Army of theRepublic of Vietnam is determined to carry out the rural pacification process…

…The population has the responsibility of supplying some of the labor for this reconstruction and for guarding the roads and bridges once they are repaired…In order to be of service to the population and the poor people of the hamlets, it is necessary for the army to take very harsh measures with any who would sabotage the work. Villages near areas sabotaged by the Viet Cong will be destroyed by artillery and air attacks and saboteurs will be shot on the spot…This is the last notice appealing to the people. Anyone not following the requests of the army will have to suffer the consequences…

PSYOP PRODUCTS

JUSPAO printed an entire series of products all with the theme of supporting the strategic hamlet program. There were 11 posters in the set, each with a different theme. Some of the images are rather dark and that is because they are from very old archived files. Perhaps over time we will find better specimens. I  depict only the one that still retain some resolution. All of the posters were prepared in 1968 and all are 17 x 22-inches in size.

Poster 2553

This poster depicts Vietnamese working on a bridge and the road leading to the hamlet. The text is:

ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW LIFE HAMLET

The road system is being repaired and improved to be suitable for the activities of the compatriots.

Poster 2573

The poster shows farmers tilling the field and the text:

ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW LIFE HAMLET

Is the development of farming to provide people with the necessary means to improve their income and the living standards of the farmers.

Poster 2577

This poster depicts farmers working the field and being assigned their own plots of land. The text is:

INITIATE LAND REFORM

One objective of the New Life Hamlets is to initiate land reform aiming toward improvement of the tenant farmer’s condition and logical distribution of lands and fields so that farmers have land to till.

Poster 2584

This poster depicts Vietnamese learning to read at a hamlet school. The text is:

ERADICATE ILLITERACY

One objective of the New Life Hamlet is to eradicate illiteracy in order to bring progress and knowledge to the people.

Poster 2585

This poster depicts the Vietnamese burying their trash and being inoculated. The text is:

COMBAT DISEASE

One objective of the New Life Hamlets is to combat diseases:

Provide guidance in the maintenance of family and public sanitation

Provide facilities to help prevent and cure diseases.

Counter superstitious treatment of patients.

Poster 2602

This poster depicts the Vietnamese protecting their hamlet. One man builds a guard post while four armed men start a patrol and four others stand watch in a ditch. The text is:

ONE OBJECTIVE OF THE NEW LIFE HAMLETS IS TO ORGANIZE THE PEOPLE TO ENGAGE IN THE ANTI-COMMUNIST STRUGGLE

Motivate the people to organize combat hamlets to maintain security so that people can build and enjoy their bright new life.

Poster 2615

This poster depicts a young boy watching as two Communist Viet Cong attempt to steal produce to feed their comrades. The text is:

ERADICATE UNDERGROUND COMMUNISTS

One objective of New Life Hamlets is to eradicate underground communists.

A factor that brings about victory over the Communists is to separate the Communists from the people through the tracking down of Communist grass-root structures until their complete destruction.

Poster 2658

This poster shows the people in the hamlet working together to build a house, armed villagers starting a patrol and a group democratically talking together. The text is:

ORGANIZE THE PEOPLE AND ESTABLISH A DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION

One objective of the New Life Hamlet is to organize the people and establish democratic institutions in order to facilitate the defense and reconstruction of villages and hamlets according to democratic systems.

Poster 2665

This poster depicts the Vietnamese working together at the left, voting in the center and studying defensive tactics being taught by a solider at the right. The text is:

TO BUILD A NEW SPIRIT

One objective of the New Life Hamlets is to build a new spirit.

That is the spirit of unity to create a community force, openness that leads to mutual understanding, morals that heighten the virtues of humanity, integrity, civility, intelligence and trustworthiness, nationalism to preserve the nation’s qualities, a scientific mind for advancement, and responsibility to utilize the rights of citizenship.

Handout 2368

This December 1967 handout is entitled “Eleven Objectives of New Life Hamlets.” It bears the emblem of the “Fatherland of the People” at the top right, and then goes on to explain all 11 objectives of the new life hamlets. The explanations are very detailed, so I will only mention the eleven headings:

1. Eradicate underground Communists.
2. Eradicate tyrannical and corrupt officials.
3. Build a new spirit.
4. Regiment civilian ranks and establish democratic institutions.
5. Organize the people to engage in anti-Communist struggle.
6. Eradicate illiteracy.
7. Combat diseases.
8. Initiate land reform.
9. Develop agriculture and handicrafts.
10. Develop communication means.
11. Grant proper treatment to the combatants.

The handout ends with the comment that a powerful countryside builds a prosperous nation. It compares the old “gloomy life” against the new “bright life.” It concludes with the guiding concepts in the Revolutionary Development Program.

The Vietnamese People's Self Defense Corps Fights the Enemy.

Although this South Vietnamese poster is really a recruiting tool for the People’s Self Defense Force and not about the strategic hamlet at all, I think the artwork of the poster and the scene of the peaceful hamlet makes it worth adding to this article. Notice the RVN flag over the village and the men racing to defensive positions, probably alerted to a Viet Cong attack.

The Republic of Vietnam Officially Commemorates the Strategic Hamlet

Program in October 1962 with a Patriotic Set of postage stamps.

Leahy says that the Strategic Hamlet Program was a failure and gives the following reasons:

Inadequate Planning and Coordination. The strategic hamlets were inadequately planned and poorly coordinated. This was due to the desire to complete the program quickly and to the absence of a sufficient number of administrators with the knowledge and experience to implement a program of this magnitude.

Inadequate Resources. At the start of the Strategic Hamlet Program. South Vietnam lacked the necessary financial and material resources to implement and support the strategic hamlets. Financial assistance was eventually provided by many countries, such asWest Germany and Australia. but the majority of assistance was provided by the United States through the United States OperationsMission in Saigon.

Unrealistic Timetable. As if the problems of inadequate resources and poor planning and coordination were not enough, the implementation of the strategic hamlets was further complicated by the pace of construction demanded from Saigon. Faced with an increasing threat from the Viet Cong, Diem's government made a deliberate decision to complete the Strategic Hamlet Program at an accelerated pace.

Whatever the problems with the program, I was informed by an official in Afghanistan in 2011 that this article has been read for reference, so perhaps they see some factor that might be used in the present conflict. Another official informed me that Armed Propaganda Teams as mentioned in my Vietnam article were presently being trained in Afghanistan:

We are currently training Afghans to engage in the information domain and making them part of their Special Ops and Afghan National Army units. It is called the Afghan Information Dissemination Operations (AIDO) and the program is getting its legs.

At least two American military units have used my article on the Vietnam Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program to motivate the Taliban to rejoin the National Government in Afghanistan.

I guess the old saying “What comes around goes around” is absolutely accurate.

As always, the author encourages discussion and asks readers to send their comments to the author at sgmbert@hotmail.com.

Trích theo Giaovn

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